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THEORY AND APPLICATION* 
Dennis R. Henderson** 
Genuine concern has been expressed about the consequences of the 
radical transfonnation that is currently occurring in the economic organization 
of American agriculture. Increased bargaining power for agricultural producers 
has received considerable attention as a means for maintaining, even 
expanding, the importance of, and income to, the proprietary fanners in 
the U.S. This attention is manifested in efforts to obtain legislation that 
will facilitate collective bargaining by farmers. One such proposal, the 
Ohio Agricultural Marketing Rights Bill of 1973, is the primary focus of this 
Conference. 
My attention today will be directed primarily toward the question, 
"What changes can we expect in agricultural marketing as a result of 
legislation such as the Ohio bargaining proposal?" For an adequate 
answer we must examine: 1) the potential benefits that can accrue to 
farmers through collective bargaining; 2) the market situations in which 
collective bargaining can be effective; 3) the conditions that must be met 
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for effective bargaining; 4) the commodity markets in Ohio to determine 
where the proposed legislation will likely have its greatest impact; and, 
5) the implications of collective bargaining by farmers for different groups 
within our society. 
Potential Bargaining Gains 
It is important that tanners have realistic expectations of the economic 
gains that can be achieved from collective bargaining. There are four major 
sources of such gains, some of which can and others that cannot reasonably 
be expected as a result of the Ohio legislative proposal. Let me discuss 
each briefly. 
1. Handlers' Profits -- Farmers can bargain away some or all of any 
excess profits currently being earned by the handlers and processors to whom 
they sell. This potential, however, is not great. For the most part, handlers 
and other processors of Ohio's agricultural commodities are not earning high 
profits and little gain can be expected from any attempt to squeeze their 
profits. If processing becomes unprofitable, handlers will be forced to 
dose or to buy their commodities from producers in other areas, neither very 
desirable alternatives. Most processors operate in national markets, thus 
they cannot pay significantly higher prices in Ohio than their competitors 
pay in other areas. Most bargaining efforts organized on a local or area 
basis cannot realistically expect to achieve substantial economic gains from 
this source. 
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2. Higher Consumer Prices -- The largest potential for gains from 
bargaining is to negotiate for higher prices that are passed on to consumers. 
Substantial price increases can be realized if the bargaining opponent has 
the capacity to pass on the higher costs to their customers. The apparent 
success of labor unions in the automobile industry stands as an example. 
However, this can occur only when the handler or processor has a high 
degree of monopoly power m the markets in which he sells and when close 
substitute products do not exist. Seldom will a local or regional farmer 
bargaining association be facing a handler who possesses such avvesome market 
power. This occurs even more infrequently when the bargaining association 
deals with handlers on a plant-by-plant basis, as would be required under 
the Ohio proposal. Thus, the potential for Ohio farmers to realize economic 
gains from this source is also rather small. 
3. Improved Handler Efficiency -- A significant source of potential 
bargaining gains under the Ohio proposal is to capture savings from lower 
cost operations in handling, processing, and distribution. The absence of 
excess profits among handlers is not conclusive evidence that the prices 
paid to farmers could not be increased without higher resale prices. The 
handlers may be operating inefficiently. That is, they may have more 
employees than necessary, they may be paying higher than competitive 
wages and salaries, or they may be engaged in practices that are econ-
omically wasteful. For example, there may be duplicate assembly or 
distribution routes or promotional activities which do not expand sales for 
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the industry as a whole. Likewise, firms may be operating small facilities 
and not capturing all existing economies of size. In many cases, collective 
bargaining could force handlers to achieve size economies by consolidating 
their plant operations and to discipline their own operations to eliminate 
competitively wasteful practices. The resulting savings could then be 
reflected in higher prices paid to the members of the bargaining association. 
4. Market Coordination -- Not only could bargaining force handlers to 
clean up their own house, but in many cases the bargaining association may 
also be able to offer cost reductions or other advantages to the handlers. In 
our modern, industrialized food merchandising system accurate coordination 
of production and marketing activities is necessary to assure that processors 
have an adequate supply of the desired quality of agricultural products 
necessary to fulfill the consumer demands that they have created in their 
resale markets. Thus, assured supplies meeting the quality, quantity and 
timing specifications of the handlers have significant value to the handlers. 
A bargaining association may be able to guarantee handlers the requisite 
flow of commodities, thus improving coordination in the marketing system 
and performing a service of true economic value. The association may also 
be able to provide improved market information, assist producers in production 
decisions, provide mechanisms for adJudication of disputes between producers 
and handlers, and provide other services of value to the handler. 
The economic gains that can be achieved due to improved market 
coordination, as well as those that can result from improved efficiency in 
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handler operations, are benefits that can be realized by an individual 
handler on a plant-by-plant basis. These are the types of gains, therefore, 
that we can realistically expect bargaining associations to achieve under 
the provisions of state legislative proposals such as the Ohio Agricultural 
Marketing Rights Bill. Attempts to bargain substantial gains from the other 
two sources would probably be folly. 
Market Conditions Favorable to Bargaining 
To further our understanding of the potential for farmer bargaining in 
Ohio, we need to examine the market conditions under which collective 
bargaining is most likely to be a realistic alternative to the current market 
situation. These include the following: 
1. Unequal Market Power -- Collective bargaining is a means of developing 
countervailing market power when farmers are selling in highly concentrated 
markets. When there are only one or two buyers for a given commodity in a 
relatively large area, individual farmers have little influence over their 
market. The buyers, large relative to the sellers, can dictate a dispro-
portionately high share of the terms of exchange. Through a bargaining 
association, however, farmers can speak with one voice and more nearly 
equalize the powers on each side of the market counter. This situation is 
found in Ohio for many specialty crops, particularly fruits and vegetables. 
A typical tomato or grape growing area within the state, for example, will 
generally have one, at most two, handlers for that commodity. 
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2. Collapsed Pricing Mechanism -- In some markets, the open market 
price discovery mechanism has totally collapsed. That is, such a small 
quantity is moving through the open market that neither true supply nor 
demand conditions are accurately reflected. Thus, an open market price 
either does not exist or does not accurately reflect true market conditions. 
Prices that are received by producers are often distorted. Under these 
conditions producers may find that a collective bargaining association 
provides an effective framework for reflecting true supply conditions into 
the determination of price and other terms of trade. The egg market is a 
prime example of this phenomenon. Such a small share of the total egg 
supply moves through the open market that the central egg prices seldom 
accurately reflect market conditions, subjecting producers to distorted 
returns. Collective bargaining by egg producers could substantially improve 
the price discovery mechanism in this market and help stabilize producer 
returns. 
3. Non-Price Competition -- For some food products the processing and 
retailing systems depend heavily upon non-price competition such as promotion, 
product differentiation and merchandising. For these products trading con-
ditions do not splice well with a farm marketing system that is oriented 
primarily toward price. Collective bargaining may be an important means 
for reflecting important non-price variables back to the farm producer. 
There are indications that the slaughter livestock market, among others, is 
increasingly being characterized by such factors. The fast service hamburger 
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industry provides just one example. Having built a strong, continuous 
demand for a uniform product, hamburger merchandising firms have found it 
necessary to contract with producers and handlers to as sure an adequate 
supply of the desired quality and quantity of ground beef. The incidence 
of this, however, is limited. While we do have some feeders operating 
under production contracts with food fabricators, this probably is not 
widespread enough at the present time to form a viable base for collective 
bargaining. 
4. Production Contracts -- The pricing of some farm products has given 
way to production and marketing contracts with contract-making a handler-
dominated activity. Collective bargaining is particularly applicable in these 
situations as a means of improving farmers' equity in the contract-making 
activities. It also can help to improve stability by allowing farmers to 
more actively participate in decisions concerning the quantities produced. 
The largest incidence of this marketing situation probably occurs in poultry. 
Certainly broiler producers would have much to gain through strong bargaining 
efforts with vertical integrators in the industry. Additionally, we are 
beginning to see some production and marketing contracts in the pork 
industry, both in feeder pigs and slaughter hogs. Whether this contracting 
activity becomes processor-dominated or not remains to be seen. However, 
an imbalance in the relative size and market power of the contractors and 
contractees does exist and handler domination could develop. Given such 
a development, swine producers might look to a bargaining association as 
means of maintaining equity in their markets. 
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5. Cyclical Production -- Some commodities have a history of recurrent 
cycles of over-production causing an erratic flow from farms to handlers 
and processors. For these commodities, collective bargaining associations 
may be able to stabilize product supply, aligning it more closely with demand. 
Dairy producers, through their cooperatives, have dramatically demonstrated 
the feasibility of this. Additionally, in the past we have had recurrent 
over-production of many other commodities. Attempts have been made to 
smooth the grain flow with contracts between producers and grain handlers , 
for example. Most recently, however, strong demands have eliminated 
over-production for many of these commodities and the need for contracts 
and other product flow instruments has moderated somewhat. Thus, pressures 
that might otherwise manifest themselves in collective bargaining efforts 
have been reduced. 
Our brief analysis has revealed a number of market situations rn agri-
culture where collective bargaining may be desirable. The extend to which 
collective bargaining can be effective in Ohio depends upon the existence 
of some or all of these market conditions and upon the ability of the proposed 
legislation to create an environment conducive to bargaining. 
Prerequisites for Effective Bargaining 
What constitutes an environment that is conducive to collective 
bargaining by farmers? Several conditions must exist or be created to 
facilitate truly effective bargaining. These necessary conditions are: 
(1) market control; (2) recognition; (3) member discipline; (4) production 
control; and, (5) economic rationality. A brief analysis of these conditions, 
relative to the provisions of the proposed Ohio marketing bill, is in order. 
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MARKET CONTROL refers to the ability of the bargaining association 
to control enough product to gain a successful bargain. That is, the competing 
handler must be unable to get a feasible alternative supply. If the 
association does not have the mechanism to control supply at the time it 
is bargaining, its effectiveness can easily be circumvented by the handler 
by securing supplies elsewhere. Generally speaking, if bargaining is to be 
successful, a bargaining organization for agricultural commodities must have 
about two-thirds to three-fourths of the current relevant supply. 
It appears likely that under the Ohio proposal requiring the association 
to have contracts with producers supplying a specified percentage of the 
competing handler's purchases, adequate market control would be put in the 
hands of an accredited association. A question can be raised whether or not 
sixty percent of the historic supply is adequate. Perhaps this should be 
somewhat higher. Additionally, the provision allowing sixty percent of the 
historic producers to qualify for accreditation needs careful evaluation. If 
this sixty percent is composed primarily of relatively small producers, then 
the quantity represented would be well below sixty percent of the historic 
base. This would not be adequate for effective bargaining and could result 
in the accreditation of an association that could do little more than create 
false hopes among its members. 
RECOGNITION means that the bargaining association must be recognized 
by its adversary as the representative of the producers from whom he buys. 
Without such recognition, handlers can engage in many strategies to evade 
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bargaining collectively with the members of the association. The Ohio 
proposal, through provisions that require the association and handler to 
deal with one another and good faith bargaining between the two, apparently 
provides for the necessary recognition through statutory obligation. 
MEMBER DISCIPLINE refers to the ability of the association to hold 
the member-producers together as a collective person of one. For effective 
bargaining, the association must speak unilaterally for its entire membership 
and must be assured that the members will adhere to any terms it negotiates 
on their behalf. If the member-producers are allowed to negotiate on their 
own during the time when the association is bargaining for them, the bar-
gaining position of the association is seriously Jeopardized. When the 
handler knows that individual members can sign contracts irrespective of 
the actions taken by the association, there is little incentive for him to 
bargain realistically with the association. It is much to his long-term 
advantage and to the producers 1 long-term disadvantage for farmers to act 
independent of their association. Nevertheless, producer loyalty m the 
nitty-gritty of bargaining has often been unreliable. The pending Ohio 
legislation, however, may alleviate this problem. By requiring the assoc-
iation to have firm production and marketing contracts with its members for 
accreditation, assurances are built m that an accredited association will, 
within the bounds of legal recourse, effectively speak for its entire 
membership. 
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PRODUCTION CONTROL is the ability to avoid a long-term supply 
surplus. Effective bargaining usually results in higher returns to producers. 
Higher returns encourage increased production, which in turn dissipates the 
bargained gains. If long-term dilution of such gains is to be avoided, the 
bargaining association must be able to effectively control the entire pro-
duction of the commodity in the relevant area. Simply controllmg that share 
of the output accounted for by its members is not sufficient. Control of 
production is a difficult component in any agricultural policy. Local or area 
bargaining efforts that don't mandate terms for all producers and handlers 
cannot adequately cope with the problem. This will be a major limitation 
to the long-term benefits of most bargaining efforts undertaken under state 
legislation. Only where a commodity is produced in a relatively small area 
and is not subject to competition from outside producers can local or area 
bargaining associations control the long-term supply situation. For other 
commodities, this problem could be moderated but not resolved by mandating 
area-wide or state-wide bargaining for all producers. Such a provision, 
however, would bulk heavily on the individual rights of farmers. 
ECONOMIC RATIONALITY refers to an appreciation by the bargaining 
association that rational limits exist for potential bargaining gains. Farmers 
could be given strong powers to bargain, for example, but without production 
control it would be irrational to exercise such power. This would cause 
their own house to collapse. If producers push prices too high, it is 
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rational for consumers to turn to substitute products or for handlers to 
vertically integrate into the production phases of the industry. The 
proposed Ohio Agricultural Marketing Rights Bill does open the door for 
economic irrationality with the voluntary binding arbitration provision, 
although it isn't open wide. A binding settlement could result from arbitration 
that would be detrimental to the long-term position of the producers while 
givmg them substantial short-term advantages. The language of the pro-
posal does not require consideration of the long-term economic consequences 
in the arbitration process. Such an additional requirement might be warranted. 
The Ohio Situation 
We have briefly evaluated the source of gains that may be achieved 
through bargaining, the market situations where these gains may be achieved, 
and the types of bargaining activities that would be facilitated by the Ohio 
proposal. With this background, we can evaluate the commodity markets 
in Ohio to determine what the probable impact of such legislation will be 
on those markets. 
First, let's turn our attention to fruits and vegetables. It is in these 
industries where collective bargaining may be able to make its greatest 
progress in Ohio. Mo st of Ohio's fruit and vegetable markets are charact-
erized by an imbalance of market power and a handler-dominated contracting 
procedure. Through collective bargaining, producers could substantially 
increase their influence over the contracting procedure. Additional economic 
gains could be achieved if the bargaining associations take on supply 
management and coordination activities for the handlers. 
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Many fruits and vegetables are produced m localized areas with 
producers m each area historically delivering to the same handler. Thus, 
the influence of competing supplies from other areas and of alternative 
market sources is not as significant as it is for other farm products. 
Localized production also enhances the ability of the association to affect 
the long-term supply. 
The potential for supply control does not exist, however, for most 
of Ohio's other agricultural commodities. There are reasons to believe, 
nonetheless, that producers of some additional commodities may be able to 
benefit from collective bargaining. Two commodities with such potential 
are eggs and broilers. As noted earlier, the egg industry, in particular, 
is characterized by a lack of high volume central markets and the resultant 
price discovery mechanism. A bargaining association could improve market 
information and the price discovery process by more accurately reflecting 
supply conditions forward to handlers and at the same time more accurately 
reflecting demand conditions back to its producer-members. In general, 
however, egg producers are less traditionally tied to a specific handler, 
increasing the difficulty of organizing an effective bargaining association. 
The broiler market offers high potential because of the dominant 
position of relatively few contractors vis-a-vis producers. Collective 
bargaining could help restore some influence over contract terms to pro-
ducers and could also shift some industry profits or cost reductions into 
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producers' accounts . Additionally, bargaining might be organized fairly 
easily in this industry because of producers' experience with contracts and 
a relatively small number of handlers. Competition from producers in other 
areas and substitute products, however, are limitations. 
Under current conditions it is doubtful that new bargaining efforts of 
much substance will develop for other commodities. While dairy markets in 
the past have been characterized by periods of over-production and relatively 
high handler profits, effective collective bargaining has already been 
developed in these markets by dairy cooperatives operating under the Federal 
Market Order legislation. Thus, we are not likely to see much additional 
bargaining activity by dairy farmers as a result of new Ohio legislation. 
In the livestock industries, there are currently few conditions 
conducive to collective bargaining. While there is limited incidence of 
contracting by food fabricators for slaughter livestock supplies, it hasn't 
grown to the point where many producers feel threatened in contract 
negotiations. Furthermore, alternative pricing and marketing mechanisms 
are emerging in the livestock industry, such as carcass grade and yield 
selling and wire auctions, that help to assure producers fair returns without 
increased market power. 
We are beginning to see increased use of production and marketing 
contracts in the swine industry, however, particularly for feeder pigs and, 
to a lesser extent, slaughter hogs. Over time, if the incidence of these 
contracts increases and if the contracting procedure becomes handler 
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dominated, contract swine producers may look to collective bargaining 
associations to protect their equity. Let me stress, however, this does not 
appear on the near horizon. 
For grain crops the likelihood of much collective bargaining appears 
remote. Even though the number of marketing contracts is increasing, there 
are relatively few other conditions in the market that are conducive to 
collective bargaining. For example, there are strong central markets and 
a viable price discovery mechanism. No single handler tends to dominate 
any given market area, rather, a wide range of market alternatives exist for 
most producers. Additionally, because of the large number of producers 
dispersed over a wide geographic area, each with a number of market 
alternatives, it would be very difficult to define a bargaining association 
under provisions such as those included m the proposed legislation that 
tie an association to a specific handler. 
Overall, therefore, the most striking and immediate effects of the 
proposed Ohio legislation would most likely be manifested in the vegetable 
and fruit markets, with the egg and broiler markets also possible candidates. 
Ohio's other agricultural commodities will likely be little affected in the 
near future . 
Implications of Collective Bargaining by Farmers 
Our analysis has indicated that certain groups of agricultural producers 
in Ohio, specifically those that produce fruits, vegetables, eggs and 
broilers and who elect to Join a bargaining association, can be expected 
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to achieve measurable economic gain. But, there are other segments of 
our society that would be affected as well. A discussion of the probable 
outcome of collective bargaining as a result of pending legislation would 
not be complete without examining the impacts on some of these groups . 
First, the independent producer or non-member. Most efforts at 
collective bargaining have not easily handled the non-member problem. 
Labor unions, for example, force strong loyalty to the union, in effect 
eliminating non-members. That approach removes the right of the individual 
to hire out his labor as he sees fit. In agriculture, however, we have been 
concerned about protecting the rights of independent producers and their 
recourse to the marketplace. The proposed legislation reflects this concern. 
It does not require all producers of a commodity who sell to a given handler 
to Join an association, nor does it require all such producers to abide by 
agreements reached between an association and a handler. Thus, theoreti-
cally at least, the independent producers' marketing rights are protected. 
However, in so doing, the effectiveness of the bargaining association is 
reduced by making it extremely difficult for the association to speak with 
a uniform voice for all producers. On the other hand, the association, in 
its attempt to secure maximum economic gain for its membership, may secure 
a full supply contract with the handler, thus effectively making access to 
market available only to its members. The conflict between bargaining 
effectiveness and individual rights is a difficult one to reconcile. 
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Secondly, let's look at the consequences to the handlers. To the 
extent that farmers' gams from bargaining come from improved system 
coordination, handlers could actually gain. But, when bargaining gains 
come in the form of higher prices, the handler is disadvantaged. Higher 
prices come either at the expense of his profits, from forced economies in 
his operation, or from higher prices passed on to his buyers. Obviously, 
reduced profits are to his disadvantage. Likewise, forced economies m 
his operation are painful as well. This may force him to reduce employment 
or expenditures for other things that are meaningful to handlers and the 
people in their employ. And, as pointed out before, handlers' ability to 
pass higher prices on to their buyers is limited by their competitors. 
Furthermore, when a handler is limited to dealing with one as s:iciatl on, as 
would be the case under the Ohio proposal, his access to other sources of 
supply is preempted. Thus, the same freedom that we are careful to protect 
for the producer is infringed upon for the handler. 
Next, a brief look at the consumer. In all probability, the effects of 
collective bargaining by farmers will be reflected in higher food and fiber 
costs to the consumer. Sound arguments can be made that the healthy 
proprietary agriculture resulting from strong bargaining by farmers will 
benefit the consumer. In the long run, those arguments have merit. But, 
consumers cannot expect to gain significantly in a direct manner, parti-
cularly in the short run. The benefits of a sound proprietary agriculture 
to society as a whole are indirect and long-term. 
-18-
Lastly, let's look at the implications for the farmer cooperative. The 
larger cooperatives have the most to gain. Collective bargaining is a natural 
extension of their economic evolution. Such collective bargaining will help 
to assure the continuation of farmer cooperatives as an integral part of our 
agricultural society. However, the process of determining which cooperative 
should represent which farmers and under what conditions could prompt great 
conflict among various cooperatives and between cooperatives and processors. 
There is no provision in the Ohio proposal to help mitigate this problem. 
Quite likely, the smaller cooperative will be placed at a disadvantage 
relative to the larger cooperative. While the smaller cooperative is not 
excluded as a bargaining agent, it will take substantial resources for any 
cooperative to secure contracts with that share of farm producers necessary 
for accreditation. The larger cooperative is probably in a better position to 
obtain the requisite number of contracts than is the smaller organization. 
Jurisdictional disputes among cooperatives should not be unexpected. 
Furthermore, handlers may find it to their advantage to fan such disputes 
as a means of preventing accreditation of any association. 
Concluding Comment 
The future of the proprietary American fanner, as we have known him, 
is m question. The pressures forcing change in the control of American 
agriculture call for institutional innovation in agricultural markets of the 
highest order. By presenting for your consideration the Ohio Agricultural 
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Marketing Rights Bill of 1973, our farm leaders are asking a responsible 
question about the wisdom and feasibility of enhanced bargaining power 
for farmers as one such innovation. If the proposed legislation is enacted, 
not only will the wisdom of such an institution be tested, but so will the 
leadership, statesmanship, and gamesmanship of farm leaders, agricultural 
producers and agribusinessmen. 
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